Raquel Vaz-Pinto is Assistant Professor at the Catholic University of Portugal and President of the Portuguese Political Science Association.

She has a BA in International Relations from University Lusíada (1996) and an MSc in International Politics of Asia and Africa from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. Her Phd Thesis (2005) titled «International Society, Standard of Civilisation, and the Abolition of the Death Penalty: the United Nations and China» was supervised by Professor Robert F. Dernberger, University of Michigan and António Saldanha, University of Lisbon. From 2006 to 2009 she was a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Catholic University of Portugal where she concluded the project titled «International Society, Liberty and the Right to a Fair Trial: a comparative analysis between China, Taiwan and the USA». For the PhD and the Post-Doctoral programmes she was awarded a Grant by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology. At the Catholic University of Portugal she teaches several courses to the BA, MA and PhD programmes.

Raquel Vaz-Pinto is a member of the Scientific Council of the Catholic University of Mozambique and was Country Researcher for the European Union – Gulf Cooperation Council 2014 report within the Middle East and North Africa Programme (MENA) of the European Council on Foreign Relations. She was also a member of the Study of the U. S. Institute on Foreign Policy 2013: American Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy that took place at Bard College, New York. She is a Member of the Board Commission MA Human Rights, Law Faculty, University of Minho, Portugal and a founding member of the Global Young Academy as well as co-signatory of the 2008 Tianjin Statement of Global Young Scientists «Passion for Science, Passion for a Better World». She also participated in the first Assembly for Democracy in Asia, which took place in Taipei in 2011 and is a member of the Advisory Board of the South Asia Democratic Forum.

Some publications include:

• A Grande Muralha e o Legado de Tiananmen, a China e os Direitos Humanos [The Great Wall and the Legacy of Tiananmen, China and Human Rights] (Tinta-da-china, Lisbon, 2010).
• «A Grande Muralha e o Legado de Tiananmen», in R:I -Relações Internacionais, Vol. 23, September 2009, pp. 93-100;
• «Religião e direitos humanos na China», in R:I -Relações Internacionais, Vol. 18, June 2008, pp. 71-82;
• «A política externa chinesa e os direitos humanos”, in Daxiyangguo – Portuguese Journal Asian Studies, nº 12, 2007, pp. 11-22.
• «As três tradições e os direitos humanos», in RI - Relações Internacionais, Vol. 16, December 2007, pp. 159-169.
• «Indo-China relations and the reform of the United Nations», in Daxiyangguo – Portuguese Journal Asian Studies, nº 10, 2006, pp. 143-157.
• «The evolution of Chinese criminal policy and rule by law: the individual and the state», in Daxiyangguo – Revista Portuguesa de Estudos Asiáticos, nº 8, 2005, pp. 105-125.

Her current research interests include Chinese foreign policy and strategy, religion in international relations and US Grand Strategy and is now working on a research project - US Grand Strategy and the Pacific from Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama - that aims at exploring the concept of an «American Pacific Century», which was mostly prompted by the rise of China, by putting it into historical perspective. The goal is to analyse the evolution of U. S. strategy towards the Asia-Pacific since the end of the 19^th Century by focusing on two anchor countries: Japan and China. This project has two dimensions: to ascertain the prospects for the strategic rebalancing to the Pacific by the US within its Grand Strategy and to determine the consequences of what an «American Pacific Century» entails for Europe.

The article now published in the 2014 special issue of RBPI – China Rising: Strategies and Tactics of China’s Growing Presence in the World – is titled: Peaceful Rise and the Limits of Chinese Exceptionalism. The article makes the case for focusing on the domestic factors shaping the ability of Beijing to deliver strategically, unlike most analyses that have tended to give more emphasis to the external challenges. Throughout the last thirty years of opening to the world Beijing has stressed that its rise will be peaceful and that, from a strategic point of view, China is exceptional. This article looks at the main internal challenges that stem from the process of economic growth, and it makes a case on how they constitute limits to Chinese exceptionalism and its idea of Peaceful Development. In other words, and to paraphrase Richard Haass, strategy begins at home. Raquel Vaz-Pinto conceded an interview about her article to Joana Soares.

Interview about the article “Peaceful Rise and the Limits of Chinese Exceptionalism”, with the author Raquel Vaz-Pinto

Joana Soares

1) What is, in your opinion, the importance of having analyses about China published in a magazine from a Southern country? Does it contribute for the comprehension of the South-South political agenda?

I consider it to be extremely important. The South-South dialogue has been one of the most impressive features of the last thirty years. There is an enormous common ground between countries that despite sharing some characteristics are highly heterogeneous. Notwithstanding, there is also room for competition and, in some instances, tension and conflict. This is to say that there is more to the South-South political agenda than meets the eye and, in particular, when we are dealing with such a special country as is China. This country has already been defined as a Janus-faced entity, i. e., it is able to reap the best of both worlds. It is a developing country and at the same the second biggest economy in the world and also a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. This double identity really marks Chinese foreign policy and, in particular, when dealing with other Southern countries. Although China is a main commercial partner it is also pursuing a very aggressive foreign policy, for instance, concerning arable land in countries such as Brazil or Argentina. On balance, by analyzing all these issues we are in better conditions to contribute to the comprehension of the South-South political agenda and its ability to influence international society.

2) You focus on the domestic challenges as limits to the maintenance of China’s exceptional rise, and defend that the strategy for maintaining its economic growth must begin at home (please correct me if I’m wrong). Do you believe that China can overcome these challenges in a short or medium term, so that this growth won’t be drastically slowed down?

My main point is that in order for China to continue to rise it can no longer base its strategic narrative on a peaceful approach. Although it is true that the main pillar of this rise as been an outstanding economic growth, it is no longer enough. Not only is it spilling-over to the political, diplomatic and military realms, it is also facing growing pains. In my view, if China wants to continue to rise and to truly become a global power or even a superpower, it needs to deal with some key domestic issues. The point is that because these issues stem from the process of economic growth, for instance corruption or massive urbanization, they will be extraordinarily difficult to tackle with but they will determine the ability of China to think strategically. We are already observing the slowing down of the economy and, in 2013, China «only» grew around 7, 5% and this is linked to the notion that in order for growth to benefit Chinese society it has to be sustainable. This sustainability has already been emphasised by Hu Jintao and it will continue to be so by this 5^th generation. The challenges are Herculean but we have witnessed the impressive resilience of the Chinese leadership mostly after 1989. We still have to wait and see how Xi Jinping’s first mandate will go and that should give us some clues as to the elite’s ability of tackling these domestic obstacles.

3) Is China’s new role as a global player only a spill-over of its economic weight? Wouldn’t the Chinese leaderships know that this economic power would eventually affect the political and military realms? And if so, wouldn’t they know that the exceptionalism would reach its limit, and elaborate different strategies to be used further? What would be an alternative to the Chinese exceptionalism?

China’s new role as a global player is underpinned by its economic weight, but it is also reinforced by its history and strategic culture. Unlike other emerging powers China has one of the most enduring civilizations in the world and a long history of being an Empire. Throughout the centuries the way China dealt with this outside world has left an important blueprint even for today. In other words, it is the return of the Middle Kingdom to its rightful place in the world, albeit a different and more competitive environment. By pursuing a peaceful rise, the point that Beijing is trying to make is that it just wants to focus on its economic development and, of course, by doing so it is developing the rest of the world as well. Nowadays, China is a victim of its own success and is clearly at a crossroads. It is «testing the US waters» and trying to understand the limits of what it can do and how it can project its power. We can witness this very clearly in the South China Sea and all the disputes with Japan, Vietnam or the Philippines and the emphasis on building a blue-water navy. In my view, Beijing has reached the limits of its strategic exceptionalism and is now showing that it is just like any other rising power. Beijing is already developing a more offensive take in which it is trying to reoccupy its central place in Asia. It is indeed the return of the Middle Kingdom.

4) In your article, you talk about nationalists, globalists and the defensive realists, identifying yourself in the third trend. Is there the same perception inside China? Do the ruling elite or the people of China believe that solving the challenges at home is essential to keep the international rise? Or is there another dominant point of view among them?

There is a very lively and comprehensive debate occurring within the Chinese elite and, in particular, its intellectuals. The recent survey – «China 3.0» - made by the European Council on Foreign Relations identified three broad approaches namely, nationalists, globalists and the defensive realists. It seems to me that the third approach is the one that is better able to deliver a strategy that enables China to continue rising, and that is why I paraphrase Richard Haass by saying that strategy begins at home. The focus on the domestic hurdles can be observed by the recent measures adopted by Xi Jinping concerning the fight against corruption or the call for a lesser weight of the state in the economy. At the same time, I would argue that the nationalist approach has been gaining ground and is very appealing because, for instance, it calls for strategic parity with the US. We are not yet able to fully understand the level of change required by this approach and, therefore, to understand the intensity of the revisionism espoused by «this» China, but it has been preeminent in the debates. Even more when nationalism has clearly replaced ideology and is more and more a driving force of Chinese society. But whatever the strategy adopted by Beijing one thing is certain: it will have a global impact in the world.

Read the article:

VAZ-PINTO, Raquel. Peaceful rise and the limits of Chinese exceptionalism. Rev. bras. polít. int., Brasília , v. 57, n. spe, 2014 . Available from <http://www.scielo.br/article_plus.php?pid=S0034-73292014000300210&tlng=en&lng=en&gt;. access on 18 Oct. 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201400213.

Joana Soares is a member of the Tutorial Education Program in International Relations - PET/REL and a member of the Laboratory of analysis in International Relations - LARI ([email protected] )